An issue that has received an increasing amount of attention has been the effect of financial sector conditions (and of banking in particular) on long-run economic growth. In this paper, I examine how the remnants of the U.S. financial crisis of 1893 (the "Perfect" Panic), manifested through the incidence of bank failures, affected state output growth between 1900 and 1930. Using standard growth convergence regressions I find that the "elasticity" of bank instability with respect to output growth is approximately 5 percent. This result survives the inclusion of the usual factors known to influence long-term growth, including initial measures of financial depth, and regulatory measures such as branch banking. In order to show how financial disintermediation affects long-run growth, this paper compares two extreme cases: Nebraska, with one of the highest bank failure rates, and West Virginia, which did not experience a single bank failure during this panic. This comparison reveals that the avenue by which disintermediation affected growth was through a long-lasting decline in the state's depository base (people simply stop trusting banks). Time series evidence from newspaper articles printed between 1860 and 1970 confirms this result. I find that articles with the words "money hidden" significantly increase during and after banking crises, and die off very slowly over time. Taken together, the results imply that banking crises appear to be particularly costly not just because they may amplify a business cycle downturn, but because they, in the absence of institutions that restore confidence in the banking system, may compromise long-run growth as well. JEL Classification Codes: N21, O16
"[Mr.] Syndowsky had once lost some money through the failure of a savings bank and was consequently possessed of a rooted abhorrence of all banks. So, despite the urging of his wife and children, he refused to put his wealth [$6 ,500] in a bank. Instead, he kept it in a little safe in his apartment at night and in the day time he carried it about in his wallet." [Syndowsky's Savings, Banker's Magazine, November 1912, p. 536] 1
Introduction
Over the last two decades a substantial amount of research has investigated the effect of financial development on long-term growth.
2 This literature generally finds that a country's long-run growth rate appears to be an increasing function of the country's level of financial development, leading to the conclusion that stimulating financial development can be helpful for promoting growth. Although the finance-growth nexus literature is voluminous, numerous other papers have questioned the empirical validity of such relationship. Well-known economists Joan Robinson and Robert Lucas are frequently cited in the literature as expressing skepticism over this relationship. 3 More recently, many other economists have expressed doubt about the robustness of such relationship (Watchel 2003; Manning, 2003) . In fact, the disbelief has permeated the literature enough that Levine, a leading proponent of the finance-growth relationship, mentions in his very comprehensive survey: "We are far from definitive answers to the questions: Does finance cause growth, and if it does, how?" (Levine, 2005, p. 3).
This paper offers a modest contribution to this literature by studying the experience of the U.S. at the turn of the 19 th century. In particular, it focuses on the Panic of 1893 to 1 According to Williamson (2008) , $6,500 in 1912 is equivalent to $143,375 in 2007 using the CPI. 2 Since King and Levine (1993) 's well known study, the empirical literature on this issue has essentially ballooned. Hence, it is not practical to even attempt to provide a list here. For a comprehensive survey see Levine (2005) . 3 See, for example, Levine (2005) and Rousseau and Watchel (2005) , who cite Robinson (1952) and Lucas (1988) , among others.
investigate the long-run growth consequences of financial disintermediation. The logic for studying periods of financial disintermediation follows from the observation that if financial development enhances growth, a country that experiences financial disintermediation should experience, besides a temporary downturn in its business cycle, a decline in long-term growth as well. Thus, one could evaluate the finance-growth association by studying the long-run growth patterns of countries that endure episodes of financial disintermediation at some point in their past. Episodes of financial or banking crises are clear candidates as during these crises financial markets are disrupted and many financial institutions disappear.
The focus on historical panics to investigate the finance-growth nexus should be straightforward-clearly enough time has elapsed in order to ascertain with enough statistical precision it long term growth consequences. This is not to say that the numerous episodes of banking crises around the world over the last three decades have not attracted the attention of policymakers and academic researchers. They, in fact, have. 4 Indeed, a stylized fact that emerges out of this research is that countries that experience a financial or banking crisis endure a significant decline in economic activity in the years immediately following the crisis (Dell' Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan, 2008; Goldstein and Turner, 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Kroszner, Klingebiel, and Laeven, 2007) . But this research focuses more on the short-term macroeconomic consequences of banking crises and not on its long-term growth consequences. 5 To study the long-term effects, one must rely on historical episodes of banking crises.
The Panic of 1893 is particularly useful for studying this issue because, although the panic itself was relatively short-lived, the incidence of bank failures it triggered continued well into the 1890s, engulfing most of the states in the US by 1896. To show how this 4 For a comprehensive study see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) . 5 Edwards (2007) is an exception.
adverse financial shock affects growth, I focus on the growth experience of the different states in the U.S. between 1900 and 1930. 6 In particular, I estimate standard growth convergence equations augmented by the inclusion of a variable that measures the aggregate amount of failed bank liabilities relative to total bank deposits. The main results indicate that a one percent increase in the incidence of bank failures reduced growth by about 5 percent between 1900 and 1930. The magnitude of this elasticity is as large as that of eliminating geographical restrictions on branch banking. In addition, the estimated elasticity is robust to the inclusion of the standard set of controls, such as initial income per capita, measures of education, and even initial levels of financial development. The results imply that the cost of banking instability go beyond the short-term macroeconomic consequences the literature has highlighted. They may also help to explain why it takes so long to restore growth among countries that experience banking crises.
Convergence regressions may be suggestive, but, on their own, may not be fully persuasive. 7 To complement the evidence, this paper provides an explanation, based on theoretical underpinnings, of why financial disintermediation adversely affects long-run growth. Two empirical tests, one based on a case study, and the other, on time series evidence from newspaper articles, are provided in support of the explanation.
The intuition behind the explanation of why financial disintermediation affects growth is straightforward. In the absence of deposit insurance or any other institutional arrangement that induces confidence on the banking system, depositors who experience losses or whose money becomes illiquid, even temporarily, may become reluctant to keep their money in the banking system. They simply stop "trusting" banks. This lack of trust may affect all depositors, including those that did not experience losses. With a high enough 6 The choice of this time period is explained in the next section of the paper. 7 The main drawbacks of standard growth convergence regressions are summarized further below.
degree of risk aversion and a high enough probability of a bank run or failure depositors may be induced to reshuffle their liquid asset portfolio away from the banking system. 8 To the extent that the panic induces a portfolio change in asset holdings away from the banking system and into more rudimentary forms of savings, such as keeping the money "under the mattress," financial intermediation, and thus, growth are adversely affected.
9
Studying the cases of Nebraska and West Virginia is particularly illuminating in this respect because it contrasts the experience of a state that did not suffer a single bank failure during the panic (West Virginia) with that of a state that experienced one of the highest bank failure rates during that period (Nebraska). Despite the fact that Nebraska was a much wealthier state than West Virginia in the 1890s, it suffered a very drastic decline in its level of deposits, and it did not recuperate from it until the 1920s, after it introduced state deposit insurance. Thus, relative to West Virginia, Nebraska experienced a long-term decline in its deposits, a finding consistent with the hypothesis that the panic induced a change in the portfolio allocation of liquid assets.
The second piece of evidence supporting the explanation comes from newspaper articles. In particular, I constructed a yearly index of newspaper articles with the words "money hidden" in them to gauge the incidence of general distrust in the banking system.
The newspaper index starts in 1860 and ends in 1970, spanning all major historical banking crises in the U.S. The vast majority of these articles tell tales of the extent people went through to hide their savings in cash, often because they simply did not trust banks. The time series evidence suggests three things: 1. That the incidence of "money hidden" articles spikes during banking crises years; 2. The magnitude of the spike is substantial (about 80 percent increase within two years of the crisis); and 3. That the effect remains large in the 8 The quote at the beginning of the paper attests to the significance of this intuitive explanation. 9 Section 3 below provides a more detailed discussion and the relevant references.
long-run and appears to die off after the U.S. introduced deposit insurance at the national level, clearly aiming at restoring confidence in the banking system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the Panic of 1893, which explains in more detail why is it the case that focusing on this panic is particularly useful for investigating the hypothesis that financial disintermediation reduces long-term growth. Section 3 explains in more detail the theoretical underpinnings of how financial disintermediation can adversely affect growth in the short-run and the long-run.
Section 4 presents the data and the empirical methodology behind the convergence regressions, while section 5 discusses the growth regression results. Section 6 provides the details of the case study (Nebraska versus West Virginia). Section 7 discusses the time series evidence from newspaper articles, and lastly, section 8 offers some concluding remarks.
The "Perfect" Panic of 1893
As indicated in the introduction, this paper uses the Panic of 1893 to study the longterm growth consequences of financial disintermediation. I call it the "perfect" panic (in allusion to the "The Perfect Storm") because its unique characteristics make it particularly useful for investigating this issue. There are several reasons for this. First, as Hoffman (1956) points out, this depression was amongst the most devastating crises in U.S. history, regardless of the criteria. Although it was not as damaging as the Depression of the 1930s, it was large enough to cause serious economic disruption. For example, using Romer's (1986) The figures reveal that the incidence of failures was indeed quite disperse, ranging from 0 in six states to 52 in Nebraska. In terms the liabilities, the dispersion was equally wide-from 0 to nearly 35 percent in Washington. The fact that it was so diffused is in some sense "good"
because it allows for the identification of the effect of financial disintermediation on growth.
In addition, it suggests that it was not connected to problems in any specific sector of the economy. For example, and unlike the banking failures that took place during the early 1920s, the banking failures of the 1890s were not directly linked to problems in the agricultural sector.
This observation is bolstered by the fact that there appears to be no specific cause for the Panic. Contemporary observers speculated that it was prompted by an attack on the exchange rate (Noyes 1909 , Stevens 1894 . As concerns over the ability of the government to maintain gold parity grew, investors rushed to convert their deposits into gold, much like modern-day market participants do when they attack an exchange rate regime in response to anticipated currency depreciations. Other observers, however, put more emphasis on domestic market conditions as the primary cause for the Panic (Sprague, 1910; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) . More specifically, they argue that problems in the real sector, such as a slowdown in railroad investment, the failure of a few large railroad companies, and turmoil in the stock market in May of 1893, precipitated the failure of a few large banks, which triggered the panic in June. However, there is no general consensus about this among economic historians. Wicker (2000) , for example, argues that the banking panic that took place between June and August of 1893 was independent of the uncertainty surrounding the stock market in May. In addition, he notes that the panic appears to have started with smaller institutions in the interior of the country, spreading elsewhere a short time after that.
In fact, the identification of the specific causes of the Panic continues to be an area of active research in economic history. For example, Carlson (2005) uses the 1893 panic episode to test two competing theories of bank panics-the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) self-fulfilling theory of bank panics and the real shock, asymmetric information theory of bank panics advanced by Calomiris and Gorton (1991) . He finds that actually both theories carry some empirical support. Dupont (2007) finds that the bank panic that affected Kansas in 1893 took place despite the fact that newspapers provided ample information about the financial quality of local banks. Thus, undoubtedly, the Panic of 1893 can be attributed self-fulfilling runs as well as to real and financial markets disruptions domestically and maybe even abroad.
What is crucial for the purposes of this study is that, regardless of the underlying causes of the panic, once having started, all states were vulnerable to (and indeed most of them suffered from) it.
Third, the federal government did not react to it by implementing reforms aiming at alleviating the social inequities caused by the economic calamity of the period. This stands in
sharp contrast to what happened after the Great Depression of the 1930s. The regulatory infrastructure and the far-reaching social programs of the 1930s, such as social security and federal deposit insurance, were implemented in part as a reaction to the conditions of that period. Hence, the economic consequences of the financial shock of the 1890s can be analyzed without the "contamination" of social welfare programs imposed at the federal level and can be viewed as a "clean" experiment on the long-term economic consequences of financial disintermediation.
Fourth, unfortunately it may not be possible to focus on other panics to test the hypothesis that financial disintermediation reduces long-term growth despite the fact that there were many others (Calomiris and Gorton, 1991; Wicker, 2000 and Gorton (1991) consult Hunt's Merchant magazine to obtain bank failure data for some panics in the anti-bellum period. However, this publication lasted from 1839 to 1861. Hence, it is not possible to focus on the relatively large banking panics of the 1870s and 1880s.
After the 1890s, only two serious panic episodes merit consideration as potential candidates: the Panic of 1907 and the panics of the Great Depression. Focusing on the panics of the Great Depression is not practical because, as already discussed, the intervention of the federal government "contaminates" the test. This leaves only the Panic of 1907 as a candidate. Unfortunately (or, rather, fortunately), while this panic was very 11 Calomiris and Gorton (1991) consult Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, which reports the incidence of failures and suspensions for various states. Unfortunately, this publication began in 1839 and stopped in 1861.
serious, it was mostly concentrated to trust companies in New York City and had limited fallout effects elsewhere (Moen and Tallman, 1992; Wicker, 2000) . Hence, it was not "widespread" enough to render the hypothesis testable.
Consequences of Bank Failures and Financial Disintermediation: Theory
The banking literature emphasizes several ways through which banking crises affect macroeconomic performance. These can be roughly divided into those that emphasize short-term effects, and those that highlight long-term consequences.
A. Short-Term Effects
Most papers that estimate the effect of banking crises underscore the "credit crunch"
hypothesis as the primary avenue through which banking distress affect the real side of the economy. This hypothesis, which is directly or indirectly based on the work of Bernanke (1983) , refers to the notion that an adverse shock to the banking sector permeates into the real sector via a reduction in bank lending to customers who are heavily dependent on bank loans. For example, a decline in commercial lending affects the financial health of bankdependent firms, and may even force some of them into bankruptcy. In addition, a decline in consumer lending tends to aggravate a slump in aggregate demand as banks tighten consumer credit.
Evidently, these effects tend to operate in the short-run, and work by amplifying a business cycle downturn. But as soon as banking conditions are normalized, credit is restored, and, in theory, the economy should return to its pre-banking distress level of activity. Although bank failures tend to delay the speed at which the economy recovers from its slump, the effects, at least according to these theories, are temporary.
B. Long-Run
Banking crises and failures can have long term consequences as well. A substantial literature on finance, growth, and development has established that financial intermediaries can help foster economic growth (Cameron, 1967; Goldsmith, 1969; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973; Levine, 2005) . Some papers have even established this relationship from a theoretical standpoint (e.g. Bencivenga and Smith, 1991) . Naturally, this implies that financial disintermediation will tend to retard growth. But how do banking crises can translate into a long-lasting financial disintermediation problem? In the absence of deposit insurance, or another institutional mechanism that promotes or restore financial sector confidence, depositors who experience the adverse consequence of a crisis (such as a partial or temporary loss of deposits) will tend to be very reluctant to keep their money in the banking system, when they finally retrieve it (if they ever do). To the extent that crises induce a portfolio change in savings away from banks and more into rudimentary forms of savings such as money "under the mattress," financial intermediation, and hence long-term growth is
compromised. Under such a scenario, even the mere probability of having a bank run can affect long-run growth. Ennis and Keister (2003) use a theoretical model to show how this can happen. They set up a stylized endogenous growth model in which bank runs (a la Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) can take place in equilibrium. Their model demonstrates that the probability of bank runs can affect the stock of capital and growth. Below I provide some evidence consistent with this explanation.
Empirical Methodology
One approach followed in the finance-growth nexus literature is to estimate growth convergence regressions where the growth rate of income per capita is regressed on several control variables such as: initial income per capita, measures of initial levels of education, measures of initial levels of financial depth, and, occasionally, regulatory variables hypothesized to influence growth. 12 Studies that investigate the robustness of the financegrowth nexus using cross-country data must also control for a large host of conditions such as political, legal, regulatory, and even institutional differences across countries in order to make appropriate inferences about the role of finance in economic growth. 13 The statistical finding that finance precedes long-run growth without controlling for these differences may be misleading as it may just be the result of an omitted variable bias. But adding more controls to correct for this bias necessarily reduces the degrees of freedom because the number of countries (observations) is limited. Moreover, the controls may be correlated with each other, making it more difficult to ascertain with statistical precision which is the true determinant. In the end, researchers typically settle for the inclusion of a "large enough" set of controls that does not comprise the efficiency of the estimates by consuming degrees of freedom. 14 These econometric challenges are mitigated when the research is performed in homogeneous regions, such as the different states in the U.S., a strategy that motivates the research work that looks at regions within a country, and motivates this paper as well. 15 For example, focusing on homogeneous regions reduces the necessity to control for differences in political and legal aspects, saving on the number of degrees of freedom consumed, and ameliorating the multicollinearity problem.
Thus, to test the effect of financial disintermediation on growth, I fit a regression of the growth rate of income per capita on the standard controls, and augment it by including 12 The original paper that investigates the effect of financial development on growth using growth convergence regressions is King and Levine (1993 The first independent variable included, the log of the 1900 level of income per capita, captures the degree of convergence across states. This variable is expected to be negative, indicating that, all else constant, poorer states should grow faster than richer ones.
Given that the 48 states can be viewed as 48 countries with full labor and capital mobility, I expect this coefficient to be larger than the one estimated using cross-section data. The second variable, illiteracy rate, is a proxy for education, and it is included to control for the influence of human capital on growth. Both of these variables are among the most prevalent ones in standard growth regressions (Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller, 2004; Darlauf, 16 A more detailed description of the data, including sources, is presented in the Data Appendix. which King and Levine (1993) started, which finds that financial development variables explain a great deal of the variation in long run growth.
Results
The main results are present in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows the regression results for various versions of equation (1), while Table 4 Illiteracy rate, a proxy for the level of education, also enters negatively (and significant) in the regressions.
In virtually every specification the effect of banking instability is estimated to be negative. In addition, it is so precisely estimated that it is statistically different from zero in 8 out of the 9 regressions. Thus, the negative effect of banking instability on growth is quite robust. Another robust result is the effect of branching regulation. In most regressions its coefficient is positive and statistically significant. This implies that states that permitted bank branching enjoyed faster growth rates. This result is consistent with the findings of Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2007) and Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) who find evidence suggesting that the elimination of bank branching restrictions accelerated real per capita income growth in the U.S. during the 1980s.
The estimated effect of bank density is statistically zero in all of the regressions.
Thus, there is no evidence that initial bank density had an effect on long-term growth.
However, it is important to point out that its inclusion was not to test directly whether bank density affects growth, but rather to test the robustness of the bank instability coefficient. As the regression results indicate, its inclusion had an almost negligible effect on bank instability. Table 3 shows that the effect of financial depth is positive and statistically significant. Thus, the level of initial financial depth appears to have had a strong influence on growth between 1900 and 1930.
Although the results in Table 3 are useful for identifying variables that are statistically relevant in explaining the growth rate, they are not as useful for ascertaining the variables' economic effects. To enable us to recognize these effects, Table 4 presents the implied elasticities of each of the variables included in the regressions presented in Tables 3. The implied elasticities measure the percentage increase in a state's growth rate in response to a one percent increase in the independent variables. For branching regulation, a discrete variable, the implied elasticity measure the percentage gain in growth rate for allowing branching in the state.
What stands out the most out of these two tables is the fact that the implied elasticity for banking instability-2 to 5 percent, depending on the specification considered-is approximately equal (in absolute terms) to the impact of allowing branch banking in the state.
Nebraska versus West Virginia
As indicated in the introduction, comparing the experience of these two states is useful for learning the extent to which the 1893-96 panic affected long run growth. Table 5 presents a set of basic statistics for both states. It is clear that even in the 1890s West Virginia was a much poorer state than Nebraska. Using Easterlin (1960) And, indeed, the data reveals this-banks in West Virginia tended to be larger institutions than banks in Nebraska. Using deposits per bank as an indicator of size, banks in West Virginia were nearly twice the size of banks in Nebraska.
The table also reveals one of the most important differences in banking performance outcomes: West Virginia did not experience a single bank failure during the 1890s, while Nebraska did. In fact, the roughly 8 percent of total deposits compromised by failures (whether temporary or permanent) put Nebraska at one of the worst in the nation (see Table   1 ). Perhaps the fact that they were smaller, more fragile institutions can explain part of the reason these two states faired so differently during the 1893-96 panic in terms of failures.
But the basic set of statistics suggest that Nebraska's banking system should have been relatively more resilient-Nebraska was far wealthier, and the cost of chartering banks was much lower than it was in West Virginia.
Despite this, the evidence suggests that the loss of deposits Nebraska suffered in the mid 1890s was very long-lasting. Figures 1 and 2 Virginia, is striking. Despite the fact that Nebraska continued to charter many state banks after the panic of the 1890s, its level of deposits (on a per capita basis) did not catch up to West Virginia's until the early 1920s, when Nebraska saw an acceleration in the growth rate of deposits a few years after it introduced deposit insurance. This finding is consistent with the proposition that the panic led to a loss in financial intermediation due to a long-lasting loss in the depository base. Figure 1 suggests that the introduction of deposit insurance in Nebraska may have been pivotal in attracting deposits back into the banking sector-the growth rate of bank deposits per capita accelerated a few years after its introduction. It must be pointed out, however, that this acceleration was temporary at best as Nebraska's deposit insurance system became insolvent in 1930. The search produced 641 articles, the vast majority of them telling tales, some of them sad, but many of them humorous, of people losing large quantities of cash due to robberies, fires, accidents, deaths, etc, and how they kept their holding hidden in various locations because they did not trust banks.
Next, I constructed a yearly index of "hidden money" news defined as log (1 + number of "money hidden" articles in year t). The log form is used as it facilitates the interpretation of regression coefficients as an elasticity. This news index is then regressed on Tables 6 and 7 report the regression results for various lag structures of the banking crisis variable, and for different dynamic specifications. Table 6 reports the results with the lagged dependent variable is excluded, while Table 7 reports the results with the lagged dependent variable included. The results are indeed very supportive of the hypothesis that people lose trust on the banking system after a banking crisis. Newspaper articles with the words "hidden money" in them increase anywhere from 60 to about 80 percent within two years of the panic. After 10 years, the elasticity increases anywhere from 2.64 (Table 7) to 3.67 (Table 6 ), implying that the number of articles trebles. Moreover, the results appear to be large even in the long-run-the implied long-term elasticities (computed as the cumulative banking crisis coefficient divided by one minus the lagged dependent variable coefficient) are estimated to be anywhere between 1.1 and 3.7, and virtually all of them are statistically significant that the 5 percent level.
The post-FDIC indicator variable is included to control for the possibility that distrust on the banking system declined after national deposit insurance was introduced. The results are consistent with this interpretation. The post-FDIC indicator variable is negative and statistically significant. Its magnitude indicates that the number of "money hidden" news was cut in half after national deposit insurance was introduced.
Taken together, these set of results point clearly to the hypothesis that distrust in the banking system increases phenomenally after banking crises, remaining high for an extended period of time, and that introduction of institutions such as the FDIC may have helped by restoring trust in the banking system.
Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the effect of bank distress on long run growth. In particular, it examines how the remnants of the U.S. financial crisis of 1893, manifested through the incidence of bank failures, affected state output growth between 1900 and 1930. The main results indicate that bank instability caused by the panic appears to have adversely affected output growth by 2 to 5 percent. This effect is similar in magnitude to the effect of allowing branch banking in the state. Given the importance the literature has attached to the elimination of geographical restrictions in banking for promoting growth (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2007) , this results implies that the costs of financial crises for growth are not negligible, and clearly go beyond a temporary decline in real output. To the extent that long-term growth is compromised the real costs of bank distress may have to be revised upwards.
This paper also argues that the mechanism through which bank instability affects long-run growth most likely happen through a reduction in the depository base, stemming from a loss of confidence in the banking system. Depositors that lose access to their money, even if temporarily, tend to become more apprehensive about keeping their money in the banking system. To the extent that they adjust their liquid portfolio away from banks and into more rudimentary forms of savings, such as hiding the money "under the mattress," bank deposits, and hence, financial intermediation is compromised in the long run.
As evidence in favor of this argument, the paper looks at the pattern of deposit growth in Nebraska (one of the most severely affected states during the panic) and contrasts it with the pattern of deposit growth rate in West Virginia (which did not see a single bank failure during the panic). The comparison show that, relative to West Virginia, Nebraska suffered a severe contraction on deposits per capita, and did not recuperate from it until the early 1920s, a few years after it had introduced deposit insurance.
Further evidence supporting the lack of trust explanation comes from newspaper articles. In particular, I use a yearly index of newspaper articles with the words "money hidden" in them to gauge the incidence of general distrust in the banking system. The regression results three important conclusions: 1. that the incidence of "money hidden"
articles spikes during banking crises years; 2. the magnitude of the spike is substantial (about 80 percent increase within two years of the crisis); and 3. that the effect remains large in the long-run and decline after the U.S. introduced deposit insurance at the national level, clearly aiming at restoring confidence in the banking system.
Taken together, the results imply that banking crises appear to be particularly costly not just because they may amplify a business cycle downturn, but because they, in the absence of institutions that restore confidence in the banking system, may compromise longrun growth as well.
Data Appendix
The data were collected from several sources, which are described here:
1. Real income per capita figures. 1900 figures are from Easterlin (1960) and from Mitchener and McLean (2003) . 1930 figures are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1940 figures are from Mitchener and McLean (2003) . Easterlin (1960) figures as well as those of the Bureau of Economic Analysis are in nominal terms.
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